Azrak
SelamAleykum Balkan*****e
So würde ich auch aufstellen, wobei TSS für Medunjanin auch in Frage kommt.
-
Herzlich Willkommen im Balkanforum
Sind Sie neu hier? Dann werden Sie Mitglied in unserer Community.
Bitte hier registrieren
Zmajevi
- Ersteller Kozarčanin
- Erstellt am
Wir spielen immernoch auswärts und können die Belgier mit einem 4-2-3-1 oder 4-3-3 erwarten, mit Hazard-Lukaku-Carrasco/Mertens vorne drin. Dazu noch Witsel, Fellaini und Nainggolan im zentralen Mittelfeld. Wir werden niemals 4-4-2 aufstellen, bzw. mit dieser Aufstellung beginnen.
Air-Bosna
B.O.S.N.A .I. H.E.R.C.E.G
Bei einem 4-4-2 mit Medo und Pjanic wäre in der Mitte der Weg frei für die Belgier. Ausserdem zeigt die Tradition, dass wir gegen solche Mannschaften mit nur einer Spitze agieren. Das man sich diese Formation wünscht, kann ich durchaus verstehen. Mit etwas Glück und Effizienz könnte man den Belgiern enorme Probleme bereiten. Nur bin ich kein Fan von diesem "wenn der Gegner ein Tor schiesst, schiessen wir halt zwei". Diese Theorie haben unsere Jungs eigentlich noch nie bewiesen^^ deswegen bin ich für die etwas sicherere Variante. Bin mir ziemlich sicher, dass Jajalo im DM starten wird.
1 Spieler mehr im zentralen Mittelfeld würde für die Belgier bedeuten, Nainggolan kümmert sich um Pjanic, Witsel kümmert sich um Medunjanin. -> Lange Bälle von Zuka und Spahic auf Dzeko und Ibisevic -> Ballverlust. 60-65% Ballbesitz Belgien.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mglOhyUT_io
Air-Bosna
B.O.S.N.A .I. H.E.R.C.E.G
Bei 60-65% Ballbesitz für die Belgier wird es ja wohl eher umgekehrt sein 
Ausserdem scheint Nainggolan sowieso wegzufallen.
Ich wäre für Milicevic oder Hajrovic auf den Aussen. Dafür Visca später als falschen 9er ins Spiel bringen. Von Milicevic könnten wir wenigstens 2-3 halbwegs normale Flanken von Rechts erwarten.
Ausserdem scheint Nainggolan sowieso wegzufallen.Ich wäre für Milicevic oder Hajrovic auf den Aussen. Dafür Visca später als falschen 9er ins Spiel bringen. Von Milicevic könnten wir wenigstens 2-3 halbwegs normale Flanken von Rechts erwarten.
Ermittler vermuten Terrorangriff: Brüsseler Polizisten mit Messer verletzt - n-tv.de
Hoffentlich bleiben wir am Freitag vor so etwas verschont.
Hoffentlich bleiben wir am Freitag vor so etwas verschont.
Air-Bosna
B.O.S.N.A .I. H.E.R.C.E.G
Interessante Analyse unserer Mannschaft gegen Estland. Taktisch haben wir so unsere Schwächen^^
Analysis: Bosnia & Herzegovina v. Estonia (2018 FIFA World Cup Qualifier)
Last Tuesday, Bosnia & Herzegovina opened its 2018 FIFA World Cup qualifying campaign with a resounding 5-0 victory over a hapless Estonia. Veteran center-back Emir Spahić started and completed the scoring with his first ever career brace while Edin Džeko, Haris Medunjanin, and Vedad Ibišević all also got in on the act in what was a comfortable evening for BiH in Zenica.
The improvements we saw from the team in comparison to what we witnessed during the Euro 2016 qualifying cycle were mainly in the level of the team’s intensity and directness going forward, while we saw some better attacking play in the final third with several combinations and link-up plays leading to chances created which also highlighted the team’s new-found confidence built up over the last few months following the disappointing R. Ireland Euro qualifying play-off.
Set Piece Superiority
Another positive was also one of the biggest reasons for the team’s victory which is the efficiency on attacking set pieces with three of the five goals coming via deliveries from dead ball situations. After the game, manager Mehmed Baždarević highlighted his team’s superiority in this area and touched on the fact that the group has worked hard on set pieces in training with the rewards being reaped as Bosnia used it as its main source to victory in this match.
Looking closer now at how a couple of the goals came about from the set plays and how the players’ movement in the box made them happen, the first goal will be the first one reviewed here.
Miralem Pjanić, who was at the heart of everything and involved in every goal of the match in some way, delivered an indirect freekick into the box to the far post where Senad Lulić made an early, unnoticed run that wasn’t picked up by the Estonians while Spahić, Ibišević, Džeko and Ervin Zukanović all made near post runs which occupied nearly all nine of the Estonian outfield players defending the set piece in their own box. The plan was obviously to play the ball to the lone unopposed player at the far post for him to head it to the far post where all the bodies were at and hope to create a scoring chance from it, which Bosnia did twice in the same action with Spahić eventually scoring on the second opportunity after Ibišević’s initial attempt was saved.
The second example used here will be Spahić’s second goal, from a corner delivered by Pjanić from the right hand side in the dying embers of the game.
Danijel Milićević is standing near the far post and occupies a man who is marking him in case Pjanić tries to plays a short routine while, once again, there’s a player making an early run with big man Milan Djurić doing so while four others behind him, including Spahić, Zukanović, Ibišević, and Ermin Bićakćić, all make runs to the far post and use the spare man advantage to score a fifth, exposing the flaws in Estonia’s mixed zonal and man marking defensive strategy in the process.
Pressurization
Another observation from the game was the two different types of pressing variants that Bosnia used in attempts to regain possession whenever Estonia tried to build up a play from the back.
First of all, in the above picture, Bosnia used a ball-oriented high press with as many as six players running towards the ball carrier in a quick, aggressive way to try to win the ball back and allow Estonia a chance to advance the play into the attacking half. As risky as a ball-oriented press can be due to the structural problems it creates for the team that’s chasing the ball, it worked well for Bosnia in this game when it was used and Estonia were unable to create many good threats as a result.
The second variant used was a man-oriented high press which, as can be seen above, was a ploy used to put every nearby Estonian player under immediate pressure so that they’d eventually hit a wall and lose possession of the ball. Above you can see six Estonian players in the picture and all of them are covered by a Bosnian one with the end result eventually being a forced pass from the ball carrier and ceded possession as a result which, unlike with ball-oriented pressing, allowed Bosnia to achieve its goal here without risking their tactical structure in the process.
Although it wasn’t a very competitive game for Bosnia and few things went wrong, there were some clear problems in the team’s set up which didn’t get exposed by a poor opponent on the night, but could be by more capable sides in the future if they aren’t addressed.
Disconnects and Poor Attacking Structure
Above is a classic example of some of the problems that Bosnia has had with the 4-4-2 system that Baždarević has pushed on numerous occasions since becoming manager in late 2014. Early on in the game, Ognjen Vranješ is in possession on the right hand side and is looking to carry the ball forward, but has few passing options because of the major gaps and disconnects between the midfield and attacking players. Pjanić and Medunjanin here are far too deep to control the central areas and link up with the forward players which causes Lulić to drift in centrally out of his position to make up for that while Edin Višća is making a run on the outside for Vranješ which creates a numerical situation out wide, but a huge imbalance in the middle which allows Estonia to control that zone quite easily.
Here’s a scenario where Višća and Lulić both keep their positions and push up to become greater wide options in the final third, but because of the big distances between midfield and attack again as a result of the two CMs’ deep positioning, Džeko drops much deeper from his position to become the link between the two sets of players and shorten the gap. Despite this, the problem still exists and it is once again simple for Estonia to control with higher defensive pressure while it is very difficult for BiH to construct a good attack with the unbalanced structure of its offense.
More of the same again here except with roles reversed between the two strikers with Ibišević this time dropping the deeper of the two to create that link between the central midfielders and the front four. Estonia have a simple job of defending the central spaces once more here and Bosnia’s structure is non-existent and can easily be exposed by any team that adjusts its defensive line to be positioned higher and adds some defensive pressure to exploit those gaps that Bosnia leave in midfield with this 4-4-2 formation.
With these spacing and structural problems all too evident, it begs the question of why Baždarević is continuing to push a system that doesn’t suit the players at his disposal and doesn’t inject a third midfielder for a forward to allow things to run smoother in possession, especially as he’s essentially trying to do that anyways with one of the forwards always dropping deeper to help do a job that they really shouldn’t be doing as it’s not their game anyways. Creating chances may not have been as much of a problem here as it may have been against a different team, but it’s hard to imagine Bosnia replicating such results against tougher opponents with a similar set-up to this one.
Defensive Gaps
The structural problems didn’t just go as far as the attack, but they were evident on the defensive side of things too. Whereas the two midfielders were part of the problem offensively by being positioned so deep which made it hard for them to affect the game in an attacking sense, they’re also part of the problem defensively here as can be seen above with the pair pushing up to press the Estonians back in possession, creating a gap right in front of the defense that could easily be exploited. There’s also relatively large distances between each of the defenders who are anything but compact here and the lack of defensive support from Višća on the right leaves Vranješ all alone in defending his man. It’s a collective defensive failure, but luckily, not one that was punished.
Here you again have evident gaps between defenders that shouldn’t exist and a worryingly big distance in front of them with the midfielders slowly tracking back into position, with two of them nowhere near where they should be in this play. This last example used is just more of the same.
There were plenty more instances like the situations in the pictures above but none of them were exploited by an Estonian team that just seemed like it knew little on what to do with the spaces they had in front of them. Not every opponent will be like that though and Bosnia will come across teams in this campaign, namely Greece and Belgium, who will expose these issues ruthlessly if they aren’t fixed by the time BiH face them.
Conclusion
By now, it’s become obvious that Baždarević has improved several aspects in regards to the management of the national team since taking charge but the on-field product, aside from the improvement in intensity, is still lacking. We’ve seen the 4-4-2 system he’s put in place several times now and not only are there clear issues with it that haven’t been addressed, but it doesn’t suit our biggest weapons either. 4-4-2 when played the right way can be effective on both sides of the ball (see: Leicester, Atletico, Iceland), but our tactical structure doesn’t make it possible for us to play this system and be consistently successful with it, especially against higher caliber opposition.
With Belgium away in Brussels, our toughest game in the entire World Cup qualifying campaign, next up, it’ll be crucial for Baždarević to make key changes to the team and adjust the tactics if Bosnia is to stand a chance of getting a result. The right-back position is still a dilemma with a decision yet to be made on who the starter will be from several options, while Muhamed Bešić’s injury creates a question mark as to who will play alongside Pjanić and/or Medunjanin in midfield who cannot hold things down on their own in this system, and the Džeko-Ibišević pairing’s best days slowly ebbing away.
There are several big decisions to be made regarding the starting eleven that will take to the field on October 7 and Baždarević has limited time to figure out all the answers on how he’ll find better success against a talent-laden Belgian team that possesses players like Eden Hazard, Kevin de Bruyne, and Romelu Lukaku in its ranks than he had twelve months ago in a 3-1 defeat there last time out.
If Bosnia is to gun for first place in the group, then a positive result in Brussels may be imperative as Belgium are unlikely to drop too many points elsewhere in this group but in order to achieve that, tough decisions will have to be made and the team must improve on this showing which, as weird as it may sound after a 5-0 victory, is true.
Analysis: Bosnia & Herzegovina v. Estonia (2018 FIFA World Cup Qualifier)
Last Tuesday, Bosnia & Herzegovina opened its 2018 FIFA World Cup qualifying campaign with a resounding 5-0 victory over a hapless Estonia. Veteran center-back Emir Spahić started and completed the scoring with his first ever career brace while Edin Džeko, Haris Medunjanin, and Vedad Ibišević all also got in on the act in what was a comfortable evening for BiH in Zenica.
The improvements we saw from the team in comparison to what we witnessed during the Euro 2016 qualifying cycle were mainly in the level of the team’s intensity and directness going forward, while we saw some better attacking play in the final third with several combinations and link-up plays leading to chances created which also highlighted the team’s new-found confidence built up over the last few months following the disappointing R. Ireland Euro qualifying play-off.
Set Piece Superiority
Another positive was also one of the biggest reasons for the team’s victory which is the efficiency on attacking set pieces with three of the five goals coming via deliveries from dead ball situations. After the game, manager Mehmed Baždarević highlighted his team’s superiority in this area and touched on the fact that the group has worked hard on set pieces in training with the rewards being reaped as Bosnia used it as its main source to victory in this match.
Looking closer now at how a couple of the goals came about from the set plays and how the players’ movement in the box made them happen, the first goal will be the first one reviewed here.
Miralem Pjanić, who was at the heart of everything and involved in every goal of the match in some way, delivered an indirect freekick into the box to the far post where Senad Lulić made an early, unnoticed run that wasn’t picked up by the Estonians while Spahić, Ibišević, Džeko and Ervin Zukanović all made near post runs which occupied nearly all nine of the Estonian outfield players defending the set piece in their own box. The plan was obviously to play the ball to the lone unopposed player at the far post for him to head it to the far post where all the bodies were at and hope to create a scoring chance from it, which Bosnia did twice in the same action with Spahić eventually scoring on the second opportunity after Ibišević’s initial attempt was saved.
The second example used here will be Spahić’s second goal, from a corner delivered by Pjanić from the right hand side in the dying embers of the game.
Danijel Milićević is standing near the far post and occupies a man who is marking him in case Pjanić tries to plays a short routine while, once again, there’s a player making an early run with big man Milan Djurić doing so while four others behind him, including Spahić, Zukanović, Ibišević, and Ermin Bićakćić, all make runs to the far post and use the spare man advantage to score a fifth, exposing the flaws in Estonia’s mixed zonal and man marking defensive strategy in the process.
Pressurization
Another observation from the game was the two different types of pressing variants that Bosnia used in attempts to regain possession whenever Estonia tried to build up a play from the back.
First of all, in the above picture, Bosnia used a ball-oriented high press with as many as six players running towards the ball carrier in a quick, aggressive way to try to win the ball back and allow Estonia a chance to advance the play into the attacking half. As risky as a ball-oriented press can be due to the structural problems it creates for the team that’s chasing the ball, it worked well for Bosnia in this game when it was used and Estonia were unable to create many good threats as a result.
The second variant used was a man-oriented high press which, as can be seen above, was a ploy used to put every nearby Estonian player under immediate pressure so that they’d eventually hit a wall and lose possession of the ball. Above you can see six Estonian players in the picture and all of them are covered by a Bosnian one with the end result eventually being a forced pass from the ball carrier and ceded possession as a result which, unlike with ball-oriented pressing, allowed Bosnia to achieve its goal here without risking their tactical structure in the process.
Although it wasn’t a very competitive game for Bosnia and few things went wrong, there were some clear problems in the team’s set up which didn’t get exposed by a poor opponent on the night, but could be by more capable sides in the future if they aren’t addressed.
Disconnects and Poor Attacking Structure
Above is a classic example of some of the problems that Bosnia has had with the 4-4-2 system that Baždarević has pushed on numerous occasions since becoming manager in late 2014. Early on in the game, Ognjen Vranješ is in possession on the right hand side and is looking to carry the ball forward, but has few passing options because of the major gaps and disconnects between the midfield and attacking players. Pjanić and Medunjanin here are far too deep to control the central areas and link up with the forward players which causes Lulić to drift in centrally out of his position to make up for that while Edin Višća is making a run on the outside for Vranješ which creates a numerical situation out wide, but a huge imbalance in the middle which allows Estonia to control that zone quite easily.
Here’s a scenario where Višća and Lulić both keep their positions and push up to become greater wide options in the final third, but because of the big distances between midfield and attack again as a result of the two CMs’ deep positioning, Džeko drops much deeper from his position to become the link between the two sets of players and shorten the gap. Despite this, the problem still exists and it is once again simple for Estonia to control with higher defensive pressure while it is very difficult for BiH to construct a good attack with the unbalanced structure of its offense.
More of the same again here except with roles reversed between the two strikers with Ibišević this time dropping the deeper of the two to create that link between the central midfielders and the front four. Estonia have a simple job of defending the central spaces once more here and Bosnia’s structure is non-existent and can easily be exposed by any team that adjusts its defensive line to be positioned higher and adds some defensive pressure to exploit those gaps that Bosnia leave in midfield with this 4-4-2 formation.
With these spacing and structural problems all too evident, it begs the question of why Baždarević is continuing to push a system that doesn’t suit the players at his disposal and doesn’t inject a third midfielder for a forward to allow things to run smoother in possession, especially as he’s essentially trying to do that anyways with one of the forwards always dropping deeper to help do a job that they really shouldn’t be doing as it’s not their game anyways. Creating chances may not have been as much of a problem here as it may have been against a different team, but it’s hard to imagine Bosnia replicating such results against tougher opponents with a similar set-up to this one.
Defensive Gaps
The structural problems didn’t just go as far as the attack, but they were evident on the defensive side of things too. Whereas the two midfielders were part of the problem offensively by being positioned so deep which made it hard for them to affect the game in an attacking sense, they’re also part of the problem defensively here as can be seen above with the pair pushing up to press the Estonians back in possession, creating a gap right in front of the defense that could easily be exploited. There’s also relatively large distances between each of the defenders who are anything but compact here and the lack of defensive support from Višća on the right leaves Vranješ all alone in defending his man. It’s a collective defensive failure, but luckily, not one that was punished.
Sie haben keine Berechtigung Anhänge anzusehen. Anhänge sind ausgeblendet.
Here you again have evident gaps between defenders that shouldn’t exist and a worryingly big distance in front of them with the midfielders slowly tracking back into position, with two of them nowhere near where they should be in this play. This last example used is just more of the same.
There were plenty more instances like the situations in the pictures above but none of them were exploited by an Estonian team that just seemed like it knew little on what to do with the spaces they had in front of them. Not every opponent will be like that though and Bosnia will come across teams in this campaign, namely Greece and Belgium, who will expose these issues ruthlessly if they aren’t fixed by the time BiH face them.
Conclusion
By now, it’s become obvious that Baždarević has improved several aspects in regards to the management of the national team since taking charge but the on-field product, aside from the improvement in intensity, is still lacking. We’ve seen the 4-4-2 system he’s put in place several times now and not only are there clear issues with it that haven’t been addressed, but it doesn’t suit our biggest weapons either. 4-4-2 when played the right way can be effective on both sides of the ball (see: Leicester, Atletico, Iceland), but our tactical structure doesn’t make it possible for us to play this system and be consistently successful with it, especially against higher caliber opposition.
With Belgium away in Brussels, our toughest game in the entire World Cup qualifying campaign, next up, it’ll be crucial for Baždarević to make key changes to the team and adjust the tactics if Bosnia is to stand a chance of getting a result. The right-back position is still a dilemma with a decision yet to be made on who the starter will be from several options, while Muhamed Bešić’s injury creates a question mark as to who will play alongside Pjanić and/or Medunjanin in midfield who cannot hold things down on their own in this system, and the Džeko-Ibišević pairing’s best days slowly ebbing away.
There are several big decisions to be made regarding the starting eleven that will take to the field on October 7 and Baždarević has limited time to figure out all the answers on how he’ll find better success against a talent-laden Belgian team that possesses players like Eden Hazard, Kevin de Bruyne, and Romelu Lukaku in its ranks than he had twelve months ago in a 3-1 defeat there last time out.
If Bosnia is to gun for first place in the group, then a positive result in Brussels may be imperative as Belgium are unlikely to drop too many points elsewhere in this group but in order to achieve that, tough decisions will have to be made and the team must improve on this showing which, as weird as it may sound after a 5-0 victory, is true.
Meine Aufstellung wäre:
----------------Dzeko------------------
Lulic-----------Pjanic---------Hajrovic
----------Cocalic--Cimi/Jajalo--------
Kolasinac-Zukanovic-Spahic-Vranjes
---------------Begovic----------------
Cocalic und Hajrovic würden halt ihr Leben auf dem Platz lassen. Je nach Spielstand Ibisevic, Milicevic, Medunjanin rein.
----------------Dzeko------------------
Lulic-----------Pjanic---------Hajrovic
----------Cocalic--Cimi/Jajalo--------
Kolasinac-Zukanovic-Spahic-Vranjes
---------------Begovic----------------
Cocalic und Hajrovic würden halt ihr Leben auf dem Platz lassen. Je nach Spielstand Ibisevic, Milicevic, Medunjanin rein.
