Seeds of Confrontation: The New Naval Balance in the Eastern Mediterranean
Times are changing in the Eastern Mediterranean, defined for the purposes of this article as the area bounded to the north by Greece and Turkey, to the south by Egypt and to the east by the Levantine coast. The area has recently been the scene of several naval incidents sparked by the Arab-Israeli and related conflicts as well as by equally well-established tensions between Greece and Turkey, largely -- but not wholly -- over the divided island of Cyprus and related issues. As U.S. naval priorities shift and those of Europe decline, major offshore energy discoveries have raised tensions and focused attention on the naval balance of power in the region.
Historically the area has been contested by great powers, most recently by the U.S. Sixth Fleet and the Soviet navy, the latter of which was granted base facilities at various times by friendly Arab states. The end of the Cold War saw that period fade away, although significant relics of it remain in Russia's relationship with Syria. The residual Sixth Fleet is also but a shadow of its former self, with the Italian-based command ship the USS Mount Whitney being the only permanently based asset. The Sixth Fleets strength fluctuates widely from a full-scale carrier battle group transiting between the Atlantic and Indian oceans; to the force deployed against Libya, which included an amphibious flat top; to the destroyer and coastguard cutter that accompanied the Mount Whitney to the Black Sea in 2008, when the U.S. engaged in gentle gunboat diplomacy to demonstrate its concern following the Russia-Georgia War.
The Turkish Navys Force Structure
The decline in great-power presence in the Eastern Mediterranean has put greater emphasis on the local fleets, of which the most powerful is undoubtedly Turkey's. Rebuffed by Europe and with a seriously deteriorated relationship with Israel, Turkey is now acting as an autonomous local player, with a willingness to look after its own interests using its own maritime muscle. That includes 14 conventionally powered submarines of German design, the largest such flotilla in the world. The newer boats are fitted for anti-ship missiles and the last four for surface-to-surface cruise missiles.
The largest components of Turkeys surface force are the eight 3,640-ton frigates of the American Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7) type, transferred from the U.S. -- over Greek protests -- between 1998 and 2003. These Gaziantep-class ships have been modernized with the Turkish Genesis combat-management system, which has greatly enhanced their capabilities compared to the original design. The boats supplemented eight frigates of European origin: four 3,380-ton MEKO 200 TN-II frigates commissioned between 1995 and 2000 and built in two batches, with one of each built in Turkey; and four smaller 2,900-ton MEKO 200 TN-I ships delivered in the late-1980s, the last of which was also Turkish-built.
Only one of the eight less-capable Knox-class American frigates transferred in the 1990s remains, the ships having been replaced in the coastal patrol role by cheaper-to-operate French A69-class Avisos, six of which form the Burak class. These will be replaced in turn by the impressive new Milgem corvettes, the first of which, the Heybeliyada, entered service in September 2011. These are the first products of Turkeys Mili Gemi (or National Ships) program, which has been a major component of Ankaras successful quest for national self-sufficiency in warship building. The first ship was built at Istanbul Naval Shipyard, which is also building the second, the Buyukada, to a slightly larger, more heavily armed TF100 general-purpose frigate design. Four of these are planned, along with eight corvettes.
There are plans for a bigger, 6,000-ton TF-2000 air-defense frigate also to be built in Turkey, while a new class of six air-independent submarines of Type 214TN is on order. The boats, of German design but with a good deal of Turkish equipment, will be assembled in Turkey -- as were all but three of the previous boats of German design -- and will be fully missile-capable. There are also plans to upgrade the existing 45-strong amphibious squadron with an amphibious transport dock (LPD) equipped with landing hovercraft (LCACs) and new tank-landing craft.
Turkey deploys a large flotilla of smaller vessels, including 27 missile-armed fast attack craft, 16 slower patrol vessels and 20 mine-countermeasures ships. A smaller patrol vessel is under indigenous development and the latest mine-hunters are of German design but Turkish build.
In all, the Turkish navy is developing into a remarkably powerful and increasingly self-sufficient force; the capabilities of the Turkish company Aselsan to provide radar and other high-technology equipment complements the increasing capabilities of the Turkish shipbuilding yards. Turkey's navy will be increasingly capable of carrying out sea-control and power-projection missions in the Eastern Mediterranean and looks set to be an increasingly significant maritime instrument for the Turkish government in the region.
The Greek Navys Force Structure
This can only be looked on with concern by Greece. Unlike Turkey, whose exclusion from the European Union is increasingly beginning to look like a blessing in disguise, Greece's entanglement at the epicenter of the eurozone crisis will impact its naval power, especially Athens modernization plans. Four of its 10 Dutch-designed Kortenaer-class frigates, which date back 30 years, and all four of its 1990s-era MEKO 200s require modernization, even as the order for six new frigates of the Franco-Italian FREMM type looks a long way from producing any ships. Turkey also seems to be acquiring a significant lead in air-defense surface ship capability given its deployment of Standard missiles and supporting systems in current and forthcoming frigates.
Greece's submarine program is in even greater trouble. After a saga that included accusations of poor performance, bribery, bad faith and plain inability to pay, Greeces ambitious submarine modernization and construction program with German builder HDW finally fell through in May 2011. This has left Greece with three Greek-built air-independent Type 214s of dubious capability running trials, a single air-independent modernized Neptune II 209, three Neptune I 209s with limited modernization carried out in the 1990s and three unmodified 209s. Plans for two new 214s look decidedly unlikely. Indeed some commentators say that Greece may soon have no operational submarines at all.
The procurement of four hovercraft from Russia and Ukraine was also troubled, but to a lesser extent. These vessels are important amphibious assets, along with five relatively modern tank-landing ships and older landing craft. Greece only has four modern mine-countermeasures vessels, two of them decommissioned British mine-hunters purchased in 2004-2005 and two former American vessels of 1990s vintage donated shortly afterwards. Two more of the latter may be delivered in the future. Greeces patrol forces are also weaker than Turkey's, with seven modern Exocet-armed Super Vitas among a larger number of older vessels. Athens also possesses eight modular 26-knot Osprey craft built from 1990 to 2005, the first two of which are missile boats, with the others being patrol gunboats.
Greece cannot look for much assistance from Cyprus if relations with Turkey deteriorate, as the Cypriot National Guard only has four patrol craft. Its main naval base also suffered a disastrous explosion in July 2011, which led to an Israeli proposal to rebuild, modernize and expand it, suggesting that there is perhaps a Cyprus-Israeli entente in the making.
The Israeli Navys Force Structure
Israel deploys a significant fleet of both surface ships and submarines. In order to enhance its local sea-control capabilities, it has progressively increased the size of the Saar-class vessels that equip its Third Flotilla to the 1,300-ton Eilat corvettes, which are fitted with comprehensive three-dimensional weapons and sensors and have an endurance of 20 days. These vessels have been used in the Gaza blockade along with smaller fast-attack Saars, of which Israel has 10. Israel also possesses more than 40 smaller patrol gunboats of 40 tons to 50 tons. There are plans to enhance Israel's surface capabilities with still larger ships. Given its cost and design problems, the American littoral combat ship has been rejected, and Israel now plans to build its own corvettes and small frigates in the 2,200-ton bracket. It also hopes to improve amphibious capability.
The main striking power of the Israeli navy lies in its Seventh Flotilla of submarines. Germany has partly funded the three 1,900-ton Dolphins, which are currently being supplemented by three more fitted with air-independent propulsion. These are tasked with attacking enemy craft in their home waters, covert intelligence-gathering and special forces operations, as well as with covering the operations of the 13th Flotilla. It also seems likely that these boats have a nuclear capability based around a submarine-launched version of the Popeye land-attack missile.
Israel's military standoff with Hezbollah in Lebanon also has a maritime dimension, as demonstrated by the damage inflicted on the Israeli corvette Hanit by an anti-ship missile fired from the shore in 2006. The official Lebanese navy could not inflict this kind of damage, as it has only machine-gun-armed patrol boats.
Syria, Egypt and Other Potential Actors
Israel's larger Arab neighbors, Syria and Egypt, are both experiencing the impact of the Arab Spring, with as yet unknown effects on their maritime capabilities. Syria's naval assets are small and obsolete anyway, consisting of two former Soviet corvettes and 10 old missile boats. The Syrian navy operates under army command and has most recently been engaged in coastal bombardments against domestic political protesters. Russia has supplied Syria with 72 highly capable Yakhont P-800 Oniks anti-ship missiles. These will probably be used in a land-based coastal defense role, but they add significantly to the threat faced by any forces operating off the Syrian coast -- or indeed off the Lebanese littoral if such weapons are transferred to Hezbollah as Chinese anti-ship weapons have been by Iran.
Egypt's navy is much larger, with a mixed bag of 12 frigates of American, Chinese and Spanish provenance and four Chinese-built submarines modernized with American help. Egypt also fields a significant flotilla of missile and coastal-patrol boats, equally variegated in size and provenance. Most of the vessels were acquired in the 1980s, and the only modernization in progress is the U.S.-financed building of five 550-ton large missile fast-attack craft, delivery of which started in 2011. There have been negotiations with Russia about modernizing the submarine flotilla with four Kilo-class boats, but the outcome of those talks will have to await the decisions of Egypts new government. In 2008, Egypt deployed more than 40 vessels in the Victory 41 exercise. It is doubtful if it could do the same today, or would want to.
For now, the most important impact that the change in the Egyptian regime has had on the naval situation in the Eastern Mediterranean has been Cairos post-Mubarak decision to allow the Iranian navy access to the Mediterranean through the Suez Canal, with the 2011 visit of the frigate Alvand and the fleet tanker Kharg to Syria. Continued access for the Iranians depends on the continued survival of the Assad regime in Syria.
Russia, too, has been using naval presence to demonstrate support for Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, recently sending ships -- including its carrier Admiral Kuznetsov -- to the former Soviet base at Tartus, which Moscow is renovating. This is, in part, retaliation for Americas expanded naval presence in the Black Sea. But Russia would also like to restore some naval presence in the area as a way of countering and, in Moscow's eyes, outflanking U.S. influence in Europe; Soviet-era naval units equipped with nuclear weapons can avoid NATOs planned ballistic missile shield in Eastern Europe. In any event, both Iran and Russia need Syria badly for their regional calculus, and their support for the status quo in Damascus, including through the use of naval displays and supplies of maritime weaponry, is correspondingly strong.
Other actors can also show up in the region if required. The British, despite the travails of the recent defense review, sent their newly created Response Force Task Group of amphibious ships and escorts into the Eastern Mediterranean in 2011. In addition to deploying the helicopter carrier Ocean as part of the Libyan air campaign, the task group carried out an exercise landing in Cyprus -- where the U.K. still retains sovereign base areas and a small patrol boat flotilla -- and made a quiet demonstration off the coast of Syria. Overall, the considerable combined maritime forces that were used in the Unified Protector campaign in Libya for embargo, mine countermeasures, surveillance, evacuation and bombardment operations illustrate the potential for the deployment of very significant coalition maritime forces further east, if required. French and Italian carriers, a French assault ship as well as assets from Spain were all deployed off Libya as part of the intervention, while naval forces from Bulgaria, Romania and Canada, not to mention Greece and -- in much greater strength -- Turkey, were also present. It was significant, however, that although the Libyan campaign saw the combat debut of the U.S. Navys large cruise-missile submarine, U.S. sea-based aviation came from U.S. Marine Harriers flying from amphibious ships, rather than from aircraft carriers, whose presence was required elsewhere.
Currently the emphasis in Western naval deployments is in the Indian Ocean, where maritime contributions to the air campaign in Afghanistan and contingency deployments against Iran take priority, not only for carriers but for other assets too. It was noteworthy that when a second British nuclear-powered and cruise-missile-equipped submarine, HMS Turbulent, was sent through the Mediterranean during the Libyan campaign, it did not follow up its sister HMS Triumph's Tomahawk cruise missile strikes against Libya, but rather kept its powder dry for the Indian Ocean and presumably the contingency strike plan against Iran.
The Political and Strategic Landscape
As stated at the outset, this leaves the local actors and local dynamics in the drivers seat in Eastern Mediterranean maritime affairs, where serious tensions undoubtedly remain. The heavy-handed and incompetent Israeli boarding of a Turkish relief ship on its way to Gaza in May 2010 led Turkey to brandish the threat of naval escorts to protect the passage of Turkish nationals and ships. International acceptance of the basic legality of Israel's blockade plus Western influence brought to bear in Ankara seems to have defused the prospect of such confrontations at least for the time being. Turkey has not used its fleet to protect subsequent attempts to break the Gaza blockade, although the lack of an Israeli apology and the possibility of another incident leave open the possibility for further escalation.
A perhaps greater source of danger is the confrontation over offshore oil and gas reserves under the seabed around Cyprus. This is complicated by Turkey's nonrecognition of the Republic of Cyprus and Ankaras backing of the Turkish-occupied enclave in the north of the island (itself the result of successful maritime power projection by the Turkish navy in 1974). By consequence, Turkey claims rights to the offshore energy reserves to the south and the north of Cyprus, which lie in what Ankara considers to be Turkish waters delimited by agreement with Northern Cyprus. Turkey has used its navy to confront Cypriot oil drilling and to escort Turkish vessels engaged in surveying activities in the area. Rhetoric on both sides ran especially high in September.
Israel also has claims to the east of Cyprus, and there has been a growing Cypriot-Israeli entente against Turkey. According to press reports, Israel responded to Turkey's growing hostility by flying reconnaissance drones over Turkish surveying operations. The Israeli offer to assist in the rebuilding and extension of Cyprus' naval base would provide forward basing for Israel's naval forces and powerful backing for Cypriot claims, the latter especially welcome given Greeces current travails.
Russia, whose relations with Cyprus are strong, continues to be a wildcard in this confrontation. It was reported in September that Russia was to send two nuclear-powered submarines to engage in surveillance of this potential confrontation. Such a deployment would be less reliant on Syrian base facilities than would surface ships, avoiding the need to depend upon Assad's Syria to support a Cyprus increasingly aligned with Israel.
Such crosscutting confusions are constructive to the extent that they mitigate the effects of bilateral maritime tensions. That the latter are growing, however, cannot be denied, and this provides the context for the local naval balance. Although external actors still have important roles to play, other preoccupations, especially those east of Suez, prevent the U.S. and its allies from paying full attention to the region. This may change if and when Syria dissolves into full-scale civil war and a deployment like that seen off Libya is deemed necessary. In such circumstances, Russia may abandon Assad to allow a Libya-like U.N. resolution, although it would likely insist on maintaining a base in the region to re-establish its naval power in an area it considers important to its own interests.
The Libyan crisis introduced another potential external maritime actor in the region: In the first operational deployment of a Chinese ship in the Mediterranean, the modern frigate Xuzhou was sent to cover the evacuation of Chinese nationals. Given the growth of Chinese power in general and naval power in particular, this mission could be a sign of China's desire to become an actor in the Mediterranean, a development that would have long-term impact in the Eastern basin.
The Eastern Mediterranean has always been a scene of maritime conflict characterized by clashes of local national interest overlaid with the rivalry of external powers. The situation now is no different, and it is unlikely to change in the future. But the relative decline of the traditional great powers does leave room for significant shifts in the maritime balance. For now, the big winner in this shift is Turkey, whose overall military capacity is currently in the top 10 globally, according to some calculations. Turkey's current naval fleet is not only significant but also pre-eminent among those of local actors. More importantly in the longer term, Turkey does not seem to be facing the economic difficulties that are buffeting the U.S. and the EU (especially Greece), the political upheavals that are affecting the Arab world, or the hostile environment that force Israel to concentrate on its land and air forces. For Israel, too, the sinking of the Hanit by Hezbollah raises questions about Israeli naval readiness, although as a wake-up call it might have had a more positive effect.
For now, this seems to leave the Eastern Mediterranean to the Turks, with their growing capacities for indigenous production of ships and equipment reinforcing their position. The regions future will in part depend on how far Turkey can be persuaded not to capitalize unilaterally on this favorable situation in ways that make the other actors feel uncomfortable or which finally lead to the outbreak of armed conflict and the use of force at and from the sea.
Dr. Eric Grove is professor of naval history and director of the Center for International Security and War Studies at the University of Salford, U.K. His many books include Vanguard to Trident and The Future of Sea Power.
WPR Article | Seeds of Confrontation: The New Naval Balance in the Eastern Mediterranean
WAFF | Greece & Turkey Defence Forum | World's Armed Forces Forum: Seeds of Confrontation: The New Naval Balance in the Eastern Mediterranean
