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Sammelthread Berg Karabach

Echt? Dachte sie halten zu den Azeris,von denen die meisten Schiiten sind.

Im Iran selbst Leben 18-30 Mio "Schiitische" Türken. Im eigenen Land betreiben die Mullahs Religiöse Propaganda aber im Ausland haben sie Angst vor dem Einfluss der Türken im Iran genauso wie Russland. Die Azeri Türken in Tebriz wollen zum Teil sogar die Unabhängigkeit. Bei den Medien der Revolutions Armee wird Stimmung gegen die Türkei gemacht im Falle Karabags.

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Ahmedinecad spricht türkisch.

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Ich finde es auch komisch. Türkei kommt super mit Aserbaidschan aus hat aber mit den eigenen Aleviten Probleme. Manche habe ich auch so das Gefühl das Alevitentum eher so nen politisches Ding ist.

Aleviten haben mit Schiiten genauso viel gemeinsam wie mit Hindus etc.
Das ist eine ungewöhnliche Liebe zwischen Iranern und Armeniern. Hat aber mehr etwas mit den Iranern und innenpolitischen Gründen zu tun. Sie haben auch Azeris in ihrem Land und befürchten Sezessionsbestrebungen.
Naja was heißt auch. Sie haben zwei bis drei mal so viele Türken im Land wie Aserbaidschan. Natürlich sind sie nicht an einem starken Aserbaidschan interessiert.
 
Keine der beiden Kriegsparteien hat nennenswerte Luftstreitkräfte (meist nur die SU-25 oder Mi-24), aber dafür haben beide eine relativ gute Luftverteidigung. Der ganze Konflikt wird am meisten von der Qualität und Einsatz der Bodentruppen abhängen, aber rein technologisch gesehen sind natürlich die Azeris im Vorteil (T-90 + BMP3 vs. T-72 vs. BMP-1), was aber noch lange nicht alleine den Konflikt lösen wird.

Einen weiteren Vorteil sehe ich allerdings bei den Azeris, da Georgien auf ihrer Seite steht, bzw. weil der gesamte Nachschub für die Armenier das aus Russland kommt über georgisches Territorium transportiert werden muss und die Russen müssen alleine wegen der OSCE neutral in diesem Konflikt bleiben. Iran ist zwar gegen Alijew aber werden voraussichtlich nichts unternehmen, ausser man interpretiert das ganze als eine Art Proxy Krieg.




 
Kann man mich und alle Russen wieder für anmachen. Aber imo fasst dieser Artikel ziemlich gut die Medien/ Meinung bei uns wieder.
Sicher ist, Putin telefonierte mit beiden und Medwedew will wohl zu beiden.

Auf Englisch, wenn es genehm ist.

Nagorno-Karabakh conflict: Why now, and why is it a risk for Russia?


April 5, 2016 ALEXEY TIMOFEYCHEV, RBTH
The first weekend in April marked the heaviest fighting between Azerbaijan and Armenia since 1994, in clashes that have already claimed dozens of lives. RBTH explores what lies behind this recent flare-up in tensions in the South Caucasus and what role Russia is playing, as well as why the conflict is a danger for Moscow.

What is the Karabakh conflict about?

The conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh is an ethnic conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia, which was at its height in the final years of the former Soviet Union and broke into a war in 1991-1994. The sides were fighting for control over a territory that was part of Soviet Azerbaijan but was predominantly populated by Armenians. Following Armenia’s victory in the war, which claimed over 15,000 lives, an unrecognized Nagorno-Karabakh republic emerged, supported by Yerevan.

Who is behind the recent rise in tensions?


Russian observers are convinced that the escalation of the conflict was provoked by Azerbaijan. Given the economic downturn, the authorities in Baku are seeking to divert attention from domestic problems.
Furthermore, the Azerbaijani president’s approval rating largely depends on the adoption of a tough stance regarding the return of the occupied territories, whereas Armenia, analysts point out, does not have any domestic political reasons that would prompt it to stir up tensions.

Another party interested in seeing the Karabakh conflict return to an active phase may be Ankara. According to Alexander Skakov from the Russian Academy of Sciences’ Institute of Oriental Studies, Turkey may have acted as an agent provocateur in order to once again highlight its significance in the region.
At the same time, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has said that Russia is not blaming Ankara for stirring up tension in Nagorno-Karabakh.
The current rise in tensions could hardly be called unexpected. The situation has been heating up for many months already. In late September 2015, artillery was used in the region by both sides for the first time in 20 years, killing 10 servicemen. Experts polled at the time warned that the region “was balancing on the brink of a real war.”

What is Moscow’s position?


The current rise in tensions is driving Moscow into a tight corner since it is in Russia’s interests to preserve good relations with both Azerbaijan and Armenia. Furthermore, Russia and Armenia are allies, so a further escalation of the conflict may force Moscow to openly support Yerevan. This would then put into question the “special relations” that Moscow is building with Baku, Alexander Skakov points out.
These special relations are manifest, among other things, in the two countries’ active contacts in arms trading. According to media reports, Russia has supplied Azerbaijan with $4 billion worth of weapons.
While Skakov says that Russian arms supplies to Baku were a mistake that has played into the hands of those who are interested in the current escalation, Vladimir Yevseyev from the CIS Institute was keen to point out to RBTH that Russia is far from the only supplier of arms to Azerbaijan.

What is Russia doing?


So far, Russia has been applying diplomatic levers to put pressure on the sides in the conflict. President Vladimir Putin has appealed to the presidents of both countries to end the hostilities and get down to the negotiating table, while Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu has conducted talks with his Azerbaijani and Armenian counterparts in a bid to de-escalate the situation.

What is the danger for Russia?


If there is a further escalation, the Azerbaijani-Armenian conflict could spill beyond the boundaries of Nagorno-Karabakh and develop into a full-scale war between Armenia and Azerbaijan.
Russia, having entered into a strategic alliance with Armenia, may be forced to use its troops deployed on Armenian territory and thus end up dragged into an armed conflict. In addition, an escalation in Nagorno-Karabakh is fraught with the destabilization of the South Caucasus and Russia’s North Caucasus republics.

What’s next?


Experts believe that a full-scale war is unlikely and the current escalation is an attempt by Baku to explore the reaction of all the interested parties.
Yet analysts stress that the intermediaries in the Karabakh conflict, including Moscow, should insist on deploying international observers in the region and establishing a mechanism of observation over the conflict. Otherwise, a new escalation is inevitable.

Nagorno-Karabakh conflict: Why now, and why is it a risk for Russia? | Russia Beyond The Headlines
 
Keine der beiden Kriegsparteien hat nennenswerte Luftstreitkräfte (meist nur die SU-25 oder Mi-24), aber dafür haben beide eine relativ gute Luftverteidigung. Der ganze Konflikt wird am meisten von der Qualität und Einsatz der Bodentruppen abhängen, aber rein technologisch gesehen sind natürlich die Azeris im Vorteil (T-90 + BMP3 vs. T-72 vs. BMP-1), was aber noch lange nicht alleine den Konflikt lösen wird.

Einen weiteren Vorteil sehe ich allerdings bei den Azeris, da Georgien auf ihrer Seite steht, bzw. weil der gesamte Nachschub für die Armenier das aus Russland kommt über georgisches Territorium transportiert werden muss und die Russen müssen alleine wegen der OSCE neutral in diesem Konflikt bleiben. Iran ist zwar gegen Alijew aber werden voraussichtlich nichts unternehmen, ausser man interpretiert das ganze als eine Art Proxy Krieg.





Die Iraner können nichts unternehmen, weil sie a) sich als Schutzmacht der islamischen Welt aufspielen b) damit die Aserbaidschaner im eigenen Lande erzürmen würden und c) direkt auf Konfrontationskurs zu der Türkei gehen müssten. Wenn sich Russland nicht engagiert, stehen die Armenier alleine dar.
 

Who is behind the recent rise in tensions?


Russian observers are convinced that the escalation of the conflict was provoked by Azerbaijan. Given the economic downturn, the authorities in Baku are seeking to divert attention from domestic problems.
Furthermore, the Azerbaijani president’s approval rating largely depends on the adoption of a tough stance regarding the return of the occupied territories, whereas Armenia, analysts point out, does not have any domestic political reasons that would prompt it to stir up tensions.

Another party interested in seeing the Karabakh conflict return to an active phase may be Ankara. According to Alexander Skakov from the Russian Academy of Sciences’ Institute of Oriental Studies, Turkey may have acted as an agent provocateur in order to once again highlight its significance in the region.
At the same time, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has said that Russia is not blaming Ankara for stirring up tension in Nagorno-Karabakh.
The current rise in tensions could hardly be called unexpected. The situation has been heating up for many months already. In late September 2015, artillery was used in the region by both sides for the first time in 20 years, killing 10 servicemen. Experts polled at the time warned that the region “was balancing on the brink of a real war.”


Ist klar. :D Fall gelöst.
 
Ist klar. :D Fall gelöst.

Hat niemand gesagt. Aber so wie im russischen TV viel gemacht wird auf Unschuldslamm und schuld sind immer nur alle anderen, v.a. die Amis. So könnte ich mir das auch für die Türken vorstellen. Die Türkei verfolgt genauso ihre Interessen, auch knallhart und nicht pur altruistisch. Worum es geht, ist einander zuzuhören und vielleicht mal bisschen nachzudenken. Ihr habt als Türken genauso viel oder wenig den Stein der Weisen oder auch Wahrheit gegessen wie irgend jemand sonst.

Hier noch die Analyse EINES Russen, auch Englisch.

Why the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict is a no-win situation for Moscow


April 4, 2016 VLADIMIR MIKHEEV, SPECIAL TO RBTH
With the largest border clashes since 1994 pushing Armenia and Azerbaijan to the brink of a full-fledged war over the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh, the recent developments that may have reactivated the latent conflict are now under the spotlight

The core reasons for the latest flare-up in hostilities between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh remain largely obscure. Yet several developments in the region in the last six or seven years have inadvertently contributed to Armenia and Azerbaijan inching toward a military conflict.
Mismanagement of foreign policy has allowed bellicose rhetoric on both sides to spread the illusion of a military solution to the territorial dispute rooted in the self-proclaimed republic, an enclave constituting 21 percent of the territory of Azerbaijan that has been under Armenian control since a ceasefire in 1994 brought an end to a war over the region in the early 1990s after the breakup of the USSR.
Part of the blame rests with the Minsk Group, charged in 1992 by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) with finding an acceptable solution to the dispute. Negotiations are proceeding at a snail’s pace.
The only excuse to be found is that territorial disputes, by definition, especially burdened with ethnic and religious overtones, are the hardest to deal with. The stalemate between Russia and Japan over the ownership of the South Kuril Islands is a case in point.

Baku ups the stakes


The first warning trial balloon, most probably aimed to test the reaction of Moscow, was sent up into the air by none other than the highly reputed Azerbaijani ambassador to Russia, Polad Bulbuloglu.
In a recent interview with the Govorit Moskva radio station, Bulbuloglu was surprisingly straightforward: “The attempts of a peaceful solution to this conflict have been underway for 22 years. How much more will it take? We are ready for a peaceful solution to the issue. But if it’s not solved peacefully then we will solve it by military means.”

Baku seems to have been emboldened by the gradual build-up of its armed forces, capitalizing on the steady flow of oil revenues. Under the presidency of President Ilham Aliyev, which has lasted for more than a decade, the Caspian Sea state’s annual military spending has surged by almost 30 times. Last year, defense expenditures totalled some $3.6 billion – a figure that exceeds the entire Armenian state budget.
Since 2010, Azerbaijan has purchased modern tanks, combat helicopters, air-defence systems, and other military hardware from Russia, spending some $4 billion in the process.
Occasionally, Aliyev has boosted the nationalist feelings of his compatriots by claiming he would recover the “occupied lands,” i.e. Nagorno-Karabakh and the surrounding Armenian-controlled territories. Today, it looks like he wants to honor this pledge.

Yerevan as the underdog


With a 2015 defense budget equivalent to about $500 million, Armenia cannot match the military capabilities of Azerbaijan. It has long maintained the balance of power vis-à-vis its stronger neighbor by relying on its alliance with Russia.
Yerevan concluded bilateral defense agreements with Russia and is a member of the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization. In 2013, Armenia neglected the persistent overtures of the European Union to become its “associate member” and, instead, chose to join the Russia-led Eurasia Economic Union.

In February, Russia provided a $200 million loan to Armenia to fund the purchase of new weapons. However, the list under consideration, as noted by Azerbaijan’s Trend News Agency, includes neither Iskander-M nor SU-30SM fighters, meaning there is no risk of tilting the balance of military power.
Nevertheless, one element in the equation matters. Moscow recently deployed new MiG-29 fighters at its Erebuni military base in Armenia, close to the Turkish border.
While it is quite clear that Moscow acts as a security provider for Armenia, the Kremlin also tries hard not to appear prejudiced against Azerbaijan. And this policy seems to irritate some regional actors.

Is Erdogan playing Baku off against Moscow?


Following the latest outbreak of violence in Nagorno-Karabakh, Russian defense and foreign affairs ministers telephoned their counterparts in Armenia and Azerbaijan to urge the cessation of hostilities. Russian President Vladimir Putin appealed to both conflicting parties to be reasonable and insisted on an “immediate ceasefire.”
In contrast, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan phoned only his Azerbaijani counterpart, Ilham Aliyev, to express his condolences over the death of Azerbaijani soldiers, thus taking sides, which was foreseeable.
Against the dire state of relations between Turkey and Russia, with Erdogan basically being ostracized by the Kremlin, the reignited conflict over the disputed Caucasus enclave gives Moscow yet another headache and could well count as a point scored in the psychological warfare between the two states.
Ankara has nothing to lose but stands to gain should Moscow become entangled in complicated diplomatic manoeuvres in order to pacify both Armenia, its staunchest and most formal ally in the region, and Azerbaijan, which continues to maintain a privileged relationship with Russia.
Moreover, should Moscow make a faux pas, abandon its balanced approach to the warring parties and show favoritism to Armenia, it would most certainly alienate Azerbaijan, to the joy of the present Turkish leadership.
Damaging in some way or another the relations between Baku and Moscow seems to be one of the motives of encouragement provided by Turkey to Azerbaijan at a moment when the UN, the OSCE, and major world powers are calling for restraint.

Adding fuel to the fire


Trying to identify the main culprit in the re-eruption of violence in Nagorno-Karabakh, that is, who fired the first shot, could well be futile. However, the opinion of Thomas de Waal of Carnegie Europe should be duly noted.
“It is more likely that one of the two parties to the conflict – and more likely the Azerbaijani side, which has a stronger interest in the resumption of hostilities – is trying to alter the situation in its favor with a limited military campaign,” De Waal wrote in a blog posting.
“The dangerous aspect to this is that, once begun, any military operations in this conflict zone can easily escalate and get out of control,” he stressed.

A serious danger may lie in the provisions of the 2011 Agreement on Strategic Partnership and Mutual Support between Turkey and Azerbaijan. The parties pledged to render support to each other using “all possible means” in the event of an attack or aggression against one of them. Getting involved in yet another conflict would buy additional time for President Erdogan as it allows him to further stoke ultra-nationalist feeling at home.
No less worrisome is that the conflict is acquiring religious connotations. The Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), has condemned “the attack by Armenian forces on the borders of occupied Azerbaijani territories” and Yerevan's “disrespect of the (unilateral) ceasefire” announced by Baku. Azerbaijan is a member of the OIC, and is receiving support specifically as an Islamic nation.
However, the international, both regional and global, context makes the conflict around Nagorno-Karabakh not just a risky adventure but a geopolitical mistake for the warring parties.
Reignited conflict in a region plagued by an intensified yet inconclusive war against the jihadists of ISIS comes at the most inopportune moment. U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry has urged the archenemies to return to peace talks under the auspices of the OSCE, and has reiterated that there is “no military solution to the conflict.”
Actually, this is the crucial riddle. Why? Neither side is naïve or reckless enough to believe that the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute has a military solution. Why would Azerbaijan and Armenia take up arms? For them it is a lose-lose situation. Just as it is for Russia, which is unhappy with the continuous animosity and squabbling in its soft underbelly.

The opinion of the writer may not necessarily reflect the position of RBTH or its staff.
Why the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict is a no-win situation for Moscow | Russia Beyond The Headlines
 
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