In fact, the March violence in Kosovo was both spontaneous and organized. A major reason why the demonstrations grew so quickly and became so violent is that many Kosovar Albanians, especially young people, were frustrated and, in the words of one Pristina-based diplomat, "in the mood to demonstrate."
[67] The main component of most of the crowds were young ethnic Albanians, many of whom came of age after the 1999 conflict, and who feel deeply marginalized and frustrated by the lack of opportunities provided by Kosovo's stagnating economy. The fact that many ordinary ethnic Albanians rapidly went out in the streets and joined in spontaneous violence against their ethnic Serb and Roma neighbors presents an even greater challenge to the possibility of a multi-ethnic Kosovo than the alternative scenario of ethnic violence organized by a minority of ethnic Albanian extremists. Disturbingly, the 1999 conflict has left behind a large number of individuals deeply familiar with ethnic violence, both as victims and perpetrators. In other words, all too many individuals in Kosovo know well how to burn down their neighbor's house-with or without organization behind such violence.
Yet while the majority of the ethnic Albanian rioters probably came to join the protests spontaneously, there is little doubt that some ethnic Albanian extremist elements worked to organize and accelerate the violence. As with the 1998-99 actions against Serb and Yugoslav forces by KLA, most of these extremist elements organized on the local rather than the regional level, and their affiliations varied from town to town. Some were radical members of ethnic Albanian political parties, others had belonged to the KLA, and some were members of fringe groups such as the shadowy "Albanian National Army" whose initials (AKSh, Armata Kombetare Shqiptare) were often found spray-painted at the sites of rioting.