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Sousuke-Sagara
Politisch unkorrekt!
Aber was ist mit den Basken? Ihre Sprache hat so gut wie gar nichts mit dem Französischen oder Spanischem zu tun. Was sind die denn?
Und ich habe schon Karten gesehen von Armenien als römische Provinz.
Und was sind Georgier eurer Meinung nach? Ihre Schrift ist auch ganz komisch. :?
Und ich habe schon Karten gesehen von Armenien als römische Provinz.
Und was sind Georgier eurer Meinung nach? Ihre Schrift ist auch ganz komisch. :?
Schiptar
Geek
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=1688&l=1
Macedonia's name: Why the dispute matters and how to resolve it
Europe Report N°122
10 December 2001
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
On 16 November 2001, Macedonia’s parliament passed a set of constitutional amendments that were agreed in August, when Macedonian and Albanian minority leaders signed the Ohrid Framework Agreement. Later that day, President Trajkovski clarified the terms of an amnesty for Albanian rebels, in line with international requests.
These positive moves have breathed new life into the Framework Agreement. But they do not put it beyond risk, or take Macedonia itself out of danger. A powerful faction in government still opposes the agreed reforms, and will resist their implementation. Ordinary Macedonians deeply resent the way the Framework Agreement was reached and remain suspicious of the international community’s entire role. This provides a serious obstacle to the reform process, and a valid grievance for the anti-reform camp to exploit.
So far as Macedonians are concerned, the Agreement contains a double weakness. First, it redresses long-standing minority grievances mainly by reducing the privileges of the majority. Secondly, its purpose of turning Macedonia into a ‘civic state’ – while admirable and necessary – makes Macedonia an anomaly in a region of emphatically ‘ethnic’ states, three of which uphold fundamental challenges to the Macedonian identity. Greece vetoes international acceptance of Macedonia’s name, Serbia denies the autonomy of its church, and Bulgaria (while accepting Macedonia as a state) denies the existence of a Macedonian language and a Macedonian nation.
Following its success at Ohrid, the international community has tended to underestimate the profound challenge that the Framework Agreement poses to Macedonia’s already fragile sense of identity, and how this erodes the country’s capacity to implement the agreed reforms. This in turn has led to a loss of influence. The NATO and OSCE missions have let themselves be outflanked by the anti-reformists. Parliamentary elections – due next April – are no guarantee that more amenable leaders will come to power.
The conflict with part of the Albanian minority has pushed Skopje to seek security help (both weapons and political support) from the very neighbours who challenge Macedonian identity. There is a real risk that the anti-reform camp in Skopje will be tempted by a military solution, even at the risk of national partition – a move that would be welcomed by Albanian extremists.
In sum, the conflict with Albanians and the perceived shortcomings of the Framework Agreement have abruptly increased the importance of Macedonia’s identity crisis. The international community needs to reassure Macedonians on this issue in order to re-establish a more promising political environment for good faith implementation and constructive cooperation.
The most acute identity issue – and the one that if resolved would have most positive impact – is the long-running name dispute with Greece. While both countries claim the name and heritage, the Macedonian claim is not exclusive. However, only the Macedonians depend on the name ‘Macedonia’ as the designation of both their state and their people.
Greece has a more direct interest than other European Union members in stabilising Macedonia, but is extremely unlikely to amend its position without a clear message from its partners that they sympathise with and will be helpful to its basic concerns. Greek statesmanship is crucial. The Greek offer of financial and security assistance, while helpful, cannot substitute for the need to secure the Macedonian identity.
Bilateral talks to resolve the dispute at the United Nations have not yielded a solution, nor – given the nature of the issue and the regional record on bilateral negotiations – are they likely to do so. The international community has a compelling strategic reason to acknowledge Macedonia's constitutional name as a matter of regional stability, and this can be done in a way that meets Greece’s legitimate concerns.
ICG proposes a triangular solution with the following three elements coming into effect simultaneously:
- A bilateral treaty would be concluded between Skopje and Athens in which Macedonia would make important concessions, including declarations on treatment of the Greek cultural heritage in the Macedonian educational curriculum, agreement that Greece could use its own name for the state of Macedonia, and strict protection against any Macedonian exploitation of its constitutional name to disadvantage Greece commercially or legally.
- The member states of NATO and the European Union and others would formally welcome this bilateral treaty through exchange of diplomatic notes with the two parties, in which they would both acknowledge Macedonia’s name as ‘Republika Makedonija’ and promise Greece that they would consult with it about appropriate measures if the assurances contained in the treaty were violated.
- The United Nations and other intergovernmental organisations would adopt and use for all working purposes the Macedonian-language name ‘Republika Makedonija’.
Before formally acknowledging the name ‘Republika Makedonija’ bilaterally and in intergovernmental organisations, it would be reasonable for the international community to require at least two up-front concessions by Macedonia relating to the implementation of the Framework Agreement reforms, namely:
- An invitation for NATO to extend its mission for at least six months beyond March 2002; and
- An invitation for OSCE to extend its mission for a full twelve months after December 2001, with a mandate to monitor the electoral process at all stages, including full access and authority to make inquiries and recommendations.
The most crucial benefit of this package is that it would consolidate the achievement at Ohrid by boosting the Macedonian sense of security and confidence in the international community. International recognition of the country by its own preferred name would supply the critical missing ingredient in the present situation – reassurance about Macedonian national identity.
The proposed package would also address critical Greek demands: that Macedonia’s name should be changed, and that it should not monopolise the single name ‘Macedonia’. Greece would retain the right in the United Nations and other intergovernmental organisations to use its own preferred name for Macedonia (such as ‘Upper Macedonia’). There would be no bar on commercial use of the name ‘Macedonia’, or any variant of it, with respect to products or services from either Greece’s province of Makedonia or Republika Makedonija.
Also to Greece’s advantage would be the explicit reference to the proposed bilateral Athens-Skopje treaty in the proposed diplomatic notes acknowledging Macedonia’s name. For the first time, Greece would not have to depend on Macedonian promises, but would be backed by leading powers that would make clear their endorsement of the total package.
This proposal is not a cure-all and it requires the international community to break with the habit of a decade. It will be difficult to negotiate, but – in ICG’s judgement, after canvassing the proposal at length in Skopje, Athens and among some of the major international players – not impossible. The alternative – letting the name dispute fester – signals to Macedonians that the international community may not be fully committed to the Ohrid reforms, or to preserving Macedonia as an integral state. This is a message with dangerous implications.
RECOMMENDATIONS
1. In order to establish the psychological basis for achieving the crucial next steps toward securing sustainable peace in Macedonia, a major effort should now be made – led by European Union members and the United States – to resolve the dispute over Macedonia’s name in a way that provides Macedonia vital reassurance about its own national identity but at the same time meets Greece’s legitimate concerns.
2. The best prospects for agreement lie in a triangular solution with the following three elements coming into effect simultaneously:
- a bilateral treaty between Skopje and Athens involving Macedonian concessions to Greek concerns, including allowing Greece to have its own name for Macedonia, and assurances as to future behaviour;
- diplomatic notes from EU and NATO member states and others acknowledging Macedonia’s name as ‘Republika Makedonija’ and the terms of the bilateral treaty, while promising to consult with Greece on appropriate measures if the treaty is broken; and
- adoption and use for working purposes by the United Nations and other intergovernmental organisations of the Macedonian-language name ‘Republika Makedonija’.
3. Before formally acknowledging the name ‘Republika Makedonija’ bilaterally and in intergovernmental organisations, at least two up-front concessions should be required of Macedonia relating to the implementation of the Framework Agreement reforms:
- to invite NATO to extend its mission for at least six months beyond March 2002; and
- to invite OSCE to extend its mission for a full twelve months after December 2001, with a mandate to monitor the electoral process at all stages, including full access and authority to make inquiries and recommendations.
Skopje/Brussels, 10 December 2001
Macedonia's name: Why the dispute matters and how to resolve it
Europe Report N°122
10 December 2001
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
On 16 November 2001, Macedonia’s parliament passed a set of constitutional amendments that were agreed in August, when Macedonian and Albanian minority leaders signed the Ohrid Framework Agreement. Later that day, President Trajkovski clarified the terms of an amnesty for Albanian rebels, in line with international requests.
These positive moves have breathed new life into the Framework Agreement. But they do not put it beyond risk, or take Macedonia itself out of danger. A powerful faction in government still opposes the agreed reforms, and will resist their implementation. Ordinary Macedonians deeply resent the way the Framework Agreement was reached and remain suspicious of the international community’s entire role. This provides a serious obstacle to the reform process, and a valid grievance for the anti-reform camp to exploit.
So far as Macedonians are concerned, the Agreement contains a double weakness. First, it redresses long-standing minority grievances mainly by reducing the privileges of the majority. Secondly, its purpose of turning Macedonia into a ‘civic state’ – while admirable and necessary – makes Macedonia an anomaly in a region of emphatically ‘ethnic’ states, three of which uphold fundamental challenges to the Macedonian identity. Greece vetoes international acceptance of Macedonia’s name, Serbia denies the autonomy of its church, and Bulgaria (while accepting Macedonia as a state) denies the existence of a Macedonian language and a Macedonian nation.
Following its success at Ohrid, the international community has tended to underestimate the profound challenge that the Framework Agreement poses to Macedonia’s already fragile sense of identity, and how this erodes the country’s capacity to implement the agreed reforms. This in turn has led to a loss of influence. The NATO and OSCE missions have let themselves be outflanked by the anti-reformists. Parliamentary elections – due next April – are no guarantee that more amenable leaders will come to power.
The conflict with part of the Albanian minority has pushed Skopje to seek security help (both weapons and political support) from the very neighbours who challenge Macedonian identity. There is a real risk that the anti-reform camp in Skopje will be tempted by a military solution, even at the risk of national partition – a move that would be welcomed by Albanian extremists.
In sum, the conflict with Albanians and the perceived shortcomings of the Framework Agreement have abruptly increased the importance of Macedonia’s identity crisis. The international community needs to reassure Macedonians on this issue in order to re-establish a more promising political environment for good faith implementation and constructive cooperation.
The most acute identity issue – and the one that if resolved would have most positive impact – is the long-running name dispute with Greece. While both countries claim the name and heritage, the Macedonian claim is not exclusive. However, only the Macedonians depend on the name ‘Macedonia’ as the designation of both their state and their people.
Greece has a more direct interest than other European Union members in stabilising Macedonia, but is extremely unlikely to amend its position without a clear message from its partners that they sympathise with and will be helpful to its basic concerns. Greek statesmanship is crucial. The Greek offer of financial and security assistance, while helpful, cannot substitute for the need to secure the Macedonian identity.
Bilateral talks to resolve the dispute at the United Nations have not yielded a solution, nor – given the nature of the issue and the regional record on bilateral negotiations – are they likely to do so. The international community has a compelling strategic reason to acknowledge Macedonia's constitutional name as a matter of regional stability, and this can be done in a way that meets Greece’s legitimate concerns.
ICG proposes a triangular solution with the following three elements coming into effect simultaneously:
- A bilateral treaty would be concluded between Skopje and Athens in which Macedonia would make important concessions, including declarations on treatment of the Greek cultural heritage in the Macedonian educational curriculum, agreement that Greece could use its own name for the state of Macedonia, and strict protection against any Macedonian exploitation of its constitutional name to disadvantage Greece commercially or legally.
- The member states of NATO and the European Union and others would formally welcome this bilateral treaty through exchange of diplomatic notes with the two parties, in which they would both acknowledge Macedonia’s name as ‘Republika Makedonija’ and promise Greece that they would consult with it about appropriate measures if the assurances contained in the treaty were violated.
- The United Nations and other intergovernmental organisations would adopt and use for all working purposes the Macedonian-language name ‘Republika Makedonija’.
Before formally acknowledging the name ‘Republika Makedonija’ bilaterally and in intergovernmental organisations, it would be reasonable for the international community to require at least two up-front concessions by Macedonia relating to the implementation of the Framework Agreement reforms, namely:
- An invitation for NATO to extend its mission for at least six months beyond March 2002; and
- An invitation for OSCE to extend its mission for a full twelve months after December 2001, with a mandate to monitor the electoral process at all stages, including full access and authority to make inquiries and recommendations.
The most crucial benefit of this package is that it would consolidate the achievement at Ohrid by boosting the Macedonian sense of security and confidence in the international community. International recognition of the country by its own preferred name would supply the critical missing ingredient in the present situation – reassurance about Macedonian national identity.
The proposed package would also address critical Greek demands: that Macedonia’s name should be changed, and that it should not monopolise the single name ‘Macedonia’. Greece would retain the right in the United Nations and other intergovernmental organisations to use its own preferred name for Macedonia (such as ‘Upper Macedonia’). There would be no bar on commercial use of the name ‘Macedonia’, or any variant of it, with respect to products or services from either Greece’s province of Makedonia or Republika Makedonija.
Also to Greece’s advantage would be the explicit reference to the proposed bilateral Athens-Skopje treaty in the proposed diplomatic notes acknowledging Macedonia’s name. For the first time, Greece would not have to depend on Macedonian promises, but would be backed by leading powers that would make clear their endorsement of the total package.
This proposal is not a cure-all and it requires the international community to break with the habit of a decade. It will be difficult to negotiate, but – in ICG’s judgement, after canvassing the proposal at length in Skopje, Athens and among some of the major international players – not impossible. The alternative – letting the name dispute fester – signals to Macedonians that the international community may not be fully committed to the Ohrid reforms, or to preserving Macedonia as an integral state. This is a message with dangerous implications.
RECOMMENDATIONS
1. In order to establish the psychological basis for achieving the crucial next steps toward securing sustainable peace in Macedonia, a major effort should now be made – led by European Union members and the United States – to resolve the dispute over Macedonia’s name in a way that provides Macedonia vital reassurance about its own national identity but at the same time meets Greece’s legitimate concerns.
2. The best prospects for agreement lie in a triangular solution with the following three elements coming into effect simultaneously:
- a bilateral treaty between Skopje and Athens involving Macedonian concessions to Greek concerns, including allowing Greece to have its own name for Macedonia, and assurances as to future behaviour;
- diplomatic notes from EU and NATO member states and others acknowledging Macedonia’s name as ‘Republika Makedonija’ and the terms of the bilateral treaty, while promising to consult with Greece on appropriate measures if the treaty is broken; and
- adoption and use for working purposes by the United Nations and other intergovernmental organisations of the Macedonian-language name ‘Republika Makedonija’.
3. Before formally acknowledging the name ‘Republika Makedonija’ bilaterally and in intergovernmental organisations, at least two up-front concessions should be required of Macedonia relating to the implementation of the Framework Agreement reforms:
- to invite NATO to extend its mission for at least six months beyond March 2002; and
- to invite OSCE to extend its mission for a full twelve months after December 2001, with a mandate to monitor the electoral process at all stages, including full access and authority to make inquiries and recommendations.
Skopje/Brussels, 10 December 2001
Schiptar
Geek
http://www.iwpr.net/?p=bcr&s=f&o=256830&apc_state=henpbcr
Balkan Crisis Report
Macedonia Looks to US to Lean on Greece
Skopje hopes Washington will stop Greece from making the name dispute an obstacle to Macedonia’s EU membership.
By Tamara Causidis in Skopje (BCR No 581, 28-Oct-05)
Two weeks before the European Commission is set to give its verdict on Macedonia’s EU candidate status, the prime minister, Vlado Buckovski, has headed off to the United States to seek support for his country’s integration into the EU and NATO.
The government is turning to Washington out of fears that the decade-long name dispute with Greece may seriously harm its EU aspirations, after Athens warned it might veto a Brussels decision on Macedonia because of the row.
Without a strong partner or patron inside the EU, Macedonia is turning to Washington in the hope that the US may persuade Greece not to make a resolution of the name dispute a condition for Macedonia’s EU integration.
At a time of deep divisions within the EU, Macedonia backed the US-led invasion of Iraq and also sent troops there. It also supported the US position in the controversy within the EU over the International Criminal Court, ICC.
As a reward, in November 2004 the US abandoned its former neutrality over the name dispute and recognised Macedonia under its constitutional name, the Republic of Macedonia.
But Greece has remained defiant, and continues to block international recognition of the name Macedonia, as it has done since the republic declared independence from Yugoslavia in 1991.
The Greeks insist its use implies territorial pretensions towards the region of northern Greece that bears the same name.
Under Greek pressure, the EU, NATO and the United Nations recognised the state under the cumbersome compromise title of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, FYROM.
Since the UN Secretary General Koffi Annan appointed a special representative in 1995 to mediate between Skopje and Athens, little progress has been made.
In September, the UN special representative, Matthew Nimitz, proposed a new solution under which Macedonia would be called by its constitutional name by those countries that have already recognised it as such. In bilateral relations with Greece, however, the name would be Republika Makedonija - Skopje.
For international use, Nimitz said the country should keep its chosen name but transcribe it as Republika Makedonija until 2008, after which it could use the name Republic of Macedonia.
Some observers said the Nimitz compromise bore the clear imprint of US views on the dispute.
According to Slobodan Casule, a deputy and former foreign minister, writing in the daily Dnevnik, “When Nimitz puts a proposal on paper he is acting as a representative of the UN Secretary General but at the same time he represents President Bush.”
The media in Greece agreed, saying Nimitz’s proposal reflected America’s desire to reward Macedonia as a loyal ally.
Athens duly rejected the compromise. “The Greek government and people reserve the right to block [Skopje’s] participation in any international organisation should this be attempted under a name other than FYROM,” said Greek officials.
The harsh tone raised fears in Skopje that Greece might spoil Macedonia’s chances of becoming a member of the EU. Stakes are high for the republic as the EU perspective has been the only one to unite the ethnically divided country since an armed conflict ended there in 2001.
After meeting the US Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, on October 25, Buckovski said the country expected US support for Macedonia’s integration into the EU and NATO.
He said that just as the US had stepped in last November, during a crucial time when Macedonia was holding a potentially explosive referendum, he anticipated that Washington would help again at another time of need.
“I expect active support for Macedonia’s integration into NATO in 2008 but also for obtaining EU candidate status by the end of this year,” said Buckovsk, leaving nothing open to doubt.
A former foreign minister, Ljubomir Frckoski, said he was confident that Washington could resolve the dispute if it chose to.
“The Americans seem to have decided to resolve the name dispute and in general to close the issue of the country’s stability before talks start on [neighbouring] Kosovo’s final status,” he said.
Iso Rusi, editor of the online magazine Lobi, agreed, “The US wants to get out of the Balkans by 2006 and by then they want to close all remaining open issues, including the name dispute.”
Many believe that the Bush administration could influence its partners in the EU to support Macedonia’s bid for membership.
“There is no doubt that Washington can help Macedonia. The question is how much and which way,” said Frckovski.
Gerald Knaus of the European Stability Initiative, ESI, said Greece’s obsession with name dispute had prevented it from assuming the role of Macedonia’s EU patron.
“It is a pity that because of the name dispute Greece cannot play the role that Austria played for Croatia,” he said, referring to Vienna’s energetic, and in the end successful, sponsorship of Croatia’s EU membership bid.
Tamara Causidis is assistant editor of BIRN Macedonia and a regular BCR contributor.
Balkan Crisis Report
Macedonia Looks to US to Lean on Greece
Skopje hopes Washington will stop Greece from making the name dispute an obstacle to Macedonia’s EU membership.
By Tamara Causidis in Skopje (BCR No 581, 28-Oct-05)
Two weeks before the European Commission is set to give its verdict on Macedonia’s EU candidate status, the prime minister, Vlado Buckovski, has headed off to the United States to seek support for his country’s integration into the EU and NATO.
The government is turning to Washington out of fears that the decade-long name dispute with Greece may seriously harm its EU aspirations, after Athens warned it might veto a Brussels decision on Macedonia because of the row.
Without a strong partner or patron inside the EU, Macedonia is turning to Washington in the hope that the US may persuade Greece not to make a resolution of the name dispute a condition for Macedonia’s EU integration.
At a time of deep divisions within the EU, Macedonia backed the US-led invasion of Iraq and also sent troops there. It also supported the US position in the controversy within the EU over the International Criminal Court, ICC.
As a reward, in November 2004 the US abandoned its former neutrality over the name dispute and recognised Macedonia under its constitutional name, the Republic of Macedonia.
But Greece has remained defiant, and continues to block international recognition of the name Macedonia, as it has done since the republic declared independence from Yugoslavia in 1991.
The Greeks insist its use implies territorial pretensions towards the region of northern Greece that bears the same name.
Under Greek pressure, the EU, NATO and the United Nations recognised the state under the cumbersome compromise title of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, FYROM.
Since the UN Secretary General Koffi Annan appointed a special representative in 1995 to mediate between Skopje and Athens, little progress has been made.
In September, the UN special representative, Matthew Nimitz, proposed a new solution under which Macedonia would be called by its constitutional name by those countries that have already recognised it as such. In bilateral relations with Greece, however, the name would be Republika Makedonija - Skopje.
For international use, Nimitz said the country should keep its chosen name but transcribe it as Republika Makedonija until 2008, after which it could use the name Republic of Macedonia.
Some observers said the Nimitz compromise bore the clear imprint of US views on the dispute.
According to Slobodan Casule, a deputy and former foreign minister, writing in the daily Dnevnik, “When Nimitz puts a proposal on paper he is acting as a representative of the UN Secretary General but at the same time he represents President Bush.”
The media in Greece agreed, saying Nimitz’s proposal reflected America’s desire to reward Macedonia as a loyal ally.
Athens duly rejected the compromise. “The Greek government and people reserve the right to block [Skopje’s] participation in any international organisation should this be attempted under a name other than FYROM,” said Greek officials.
The harsh tone raised fears in Skopje that Greece might spoil Macedonia’s chances of becoming a member of the EU. Stakes are high for the republic as the EU perspective has been the only one to unite the ethnically divided country since an armed conflict ended there in 2001.
After meeting the US Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, on October 25, Buckovski said the country expected US support for Macedonia’s integration into the EU and NATO.
He said that just as the US had stepped in last November, during a crucial time when Macedonia was holding a potentially explosive referendum, he anticipated that Washington would help again at another time of need.
“I expect active support for Macedonia’s integration into NATO in 2008 but also for obtaining EU candidate status by the end of this year,” said Buckovsk, leaving nothing open to doubt.
A former foreign minister, Ljubomir Frckoski, said he was confident that Washington could resolve the dispute if it chose to.
“The Americans seem to have decided to resolve the name dispute and in general to close the issue of the country’s stability before talks start on [neighbouring] Kosovo’s final status,” he said.
Iso Rusi, editor of the online magazine Lobi, agreed, “The US wants to get out of the Balkans by 2006 and by then they want to close all remaining open issues, including the name dispute.”
Many believe that the Bush administration could influence its partners in the EU to support Macedonia’s bid for membership.
“There is no doubt that Washington can help Macedonia. The question is how much and which way,” said Frckovski.
Gerald Knaus of the European Stability Initiative, ESI, said Greece’s obsession with name dispute had prevented it from assuming the role of Macedonia’s EU patron.
“It is a pity that because of the name dispute Greece cannot play the role that Austria played for Croatia,” he said, referring to Vienna’s energetic, and in the end successful, sponsorship of Croatia’s EU membership bid.
Tamara Causidis is assistant editor of BIRN Macedonia and a regular BCR contributor.
port80
Top-Poster
Makedonec_Skopje schrieb:port80 schrieb:
Falsch,die Griechen waren nur Untertanen Alexanders. Alexanders Vater Phillip verabscheute euch Griechen.
Makedonec_Skopje schrieb:
Also entweder musst du sehr dumm sein oder du hast echt null Ahnung was du von dir hier hergibst.. wer erzählt dir so ein kram?? was gibst du da von dir her??? wo steht den soetwas???ch meine wir haben Kunst und Geschichts Historiker, Archäologen, kunst und Geschichts Kritiker, die alles unter der Lupe auf dieser Welt genommen haben.
Ich weiß nicht ob es dir bewusst ist, aber die höchste Universitäten dieser Welt haben sich damit befasst und sachen ausgewertet, die man heute als Fakte bezeichnet. Ich meine, jetzt kommt irgend ein Makedonec_skopje,
und behauptet das Professoren auf dieser Welt falsch liegen wenn sie sagen, und in Bücher festhalte, das
Philip stets die Griechen geehrt und war voll auf die Griechen angewiesen.
1.
Philip hat stets ein Griechischen stamm regelmäßig in seinen sitz in Philipi bei Kavala geehrt und des öfteren Zeremonien gehalten
Wie hiess dieser Stamm?????
Die Antwort erwarte ich von dir
2.Alexander der Grosse hat stets unterricht von einem bekannten Griechen,der von sein Vater angestellt und stets geehrt worden ist.
Alexanders Vater hat auch sehr sehr viele Statuen von diesen Mann anfertigen lassen...
wie hieß dieser man?
3.
Alexander heißt es auch war der Rächer der Griechen.
wieso????
4.
bevor er loszog um die Griechen zu Rächen Reiste er durch Griechenland.
wieso??? um die Menschen nach ihre wünschen zu fragen, aber,dabei
begegnete er einen sehr berühmte Griechischen Man den er bis zu seinem Lebensende ehrte...
wie hieß dieser man?
5.
als Alexander loszog und sein Fuß ins heutige Türkei setzte , besuchte er ein Grab, von einem sehr berühmten Griechischen Krieger, den sein Vater Philip aber auch Alex sehr sehr ehrten,
wer war der Man??
ok ok ich höre jetzt auf, aber noch eins muss sein.
6. Wie hieß der Grosse General neben Alexander, den stets auch Philip sehr ehrte(die Familie des Generals wurde von Philip hoch angesehen)
die 7 oder 6 Generation (man streitet sich ob es die 5,6 oder 7. Generation war) brachte eine Tochter zu welt, die als die bekannteste Griechin-Makedonin in die Geschichte einging.
wer war die Frau und welche Nationalität hatte der General???
Komme jetzt aber bitte nicht mit dem Argument ,"wir sind hier nicht in der Quiz Show" und so ein Dreck..
Ich habe hier bewiessen das Makedonec_Skopje, wirres zeug von sich gibt,deine aussage ist echt peinlich.. ich habe das ausgedruckt und in der Menza der Uni ausgestellt.... ich will dich hier nicht weiter zutexten, aber ich kann dir einen guten tipp geben den ich echt ernst meine, es ist nur zu deinem guten etwas weltanschaung sich anzueignen um auch bei fragen wie diese gerüstet zu sein. Es langt nicht nur den Namen Makedonec_Skopje in irgend welche forums zu posten, dazu noch ne flagge hinmachen und dann obendrauf sich die bomberjacke anzuziehen, die flagge dran zu nähen, und durch die Strasse "Makedonec_Skopje" zu brüllen. Hier sind andere sachen gefragt, die dann doch uns Griechen von euch Vardarskas unterscheiden.
PS:für die es nicht verstanden haben, noch zwei Bilder
J
jugo-jebe-dugo
Guest
Gentleman schrieb:
Hallo Albaner
Schön dich auch mal wieder zu sehen.
8) Schau mal öfters vorbei,den du hast noch viel zu lernen. 
hippokrates
γαμάω και
Hier noch etwas Interessantes aus der Fachwelt:
Hannoversche Allgemeine Zeitung, 16.09.2002
Geschichte wird gemacht: Ein viel diskutiertes Thema beim 44. Deutschen Historikertag in Halle
[...]
Noch weiter zurück in die Vergangenheit greift Mazedonien. Mit Griechenland hat es heftig um den Goldstern aus dem Grab im (griechischen) Vergina als Flaggensymbol gekämpft. Er wurde dort im Grab Philipps II. gefunden, des Vaters Alexanders des Großen. Beide sind von mazedonischen Pseudohistorikern enthellenisiert und zu Slawen gemacht worden. Ebenso sucht Mazedonien albanische historische Stätten und Gestalten für sich zu reklamieren: Irredenta als Geschichtspolitik. Probleme haben auch die Ukrainer mit der Frage nach ihrer Nation _ zu sehen am Dreizack im Wappen. Was ist er? Er weise, so heißt es, auf die in der Antike griechisch besiedelte Krim hin, was von den Russen abgrenzen würde. Stilistisch könnte er aber zur Kunst der Wikinger gehören, die die Kiewer Rus begründeten.
[...]
http://www.historikertag2002.uni-halle.de/artikel/p_68.shtml
Hippokrates
Hannoversche Allgemeine Zeitung, 16.09.2002
Geschichte wird gemacht: Ein viel diskutiertes Thema beim 44. Deutschen Historikertag in Halle
[...]
Noch weiter zurück in die Vergangenheit greift Mazedonien. Mit Griechenland hat es heftig um den Goldstern aus dem Grab im (griechischen) Vergina als Flaggensymbol gekämpft. Er wurde dort im Grab Philipps II. gefunden, des Vaters Alexanders des Großen. Beide sind von mazedonischen Pseudohistorikern enthellenisiert und zu Slawen gemacht worden. Ebenso sucht Mazedonien albanische historische Stätten und Gestalten für sich zu reklamieren: Irredenta als Geschichtspolitik. Probleme haben auch die Ukrainer mit der Frage nach ihrer Nation _ zu sehen am Dreizack im Wappen. Was ist er? Er weise, so heißt es, auf die in der Antike griechisch besiedelte Krim hin, was von den Russen abgrenzen würde. Stilistisch könnte er aber zur Kunst der Wikinger gehören, die die Kiewer Rus begründeten.
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http://www.historikertag2002.uni-halle.de/artikel/p_68.shtml
Hippokrates